 |
“The enemies of the Administration in Kentucky have endeavored to raise a clammour from some supposed defect in the planning or in the execution of the late expedition. Altho, I believe that the people generally pay very little attention to what these gentry say, I have never yet thought it proper to elucidate some of the circumstances which have caused their animadversion in a letter to my friend, Gov. Scott, a copy of which I have the honor herewith to enclose….
“I should however blush at my own want of prudence if any thing was omitted to guard against the success of such an attack which ought to have been done upon the probabilities which I had before me that it would be made. . . .Our safety consisted in having the Troops prepared for action at the moments warning. They could not have been better prepared unless I had made them pass the whole night under armes.” From a letter by Indiana Territorial Governor William Henry Harrison to the Secretary of War William Eustis, on December 24, 1811.
In the last three articles, we have been chronicling the controversy following the Battle of Tippecanoe, which had taken place on November 7, 1811. Increasingly concerned over the charges against his conduct of the campaign, by December Harrison had decided to fight back. Harrison was interested in future military command in the impending war against the British and Indians, and he realized that it was important that Secretary of War William Eustis and President James Madison entertain a high opinion of his abilities.
Harrison knew that his reputation was being undermined by the comments of Regular Army Colonel John Boyd, who had been second-in-command to Harrison in the battle. Boyd was claiming that the Indiana militia had been ineffective and that only the efforts of the Regular Army units had prevented defeat. To combat this criticism, Harrison began collecting statements from participants in the battle.
On December 28, Harrison wrote again to the Secretary of War as follows:
“It is impossible Sir, that I should be insensible to the torrent of abuse that has been leveled at me by some of the papers. What we call here a glorious victory-such a one as in the opinion…generally of the whole mass of citizens will produce the most important beneficial consequences to the western country and to the U. States, has been termed a ‘most distressing disaster,’ a ‘horrible butcher’…In my letter from the Battle ground (on November 8, 1811) I have said that there was at first some little confusion before the Troops were formed. I read this letter to Col. Boyd at the time and he asserted that there was none, that there never was an army formed quicker or in better order. It is possible that the Col. may since have changed his opinion-with regard to my own conduct and the measures taken to secure the victory after the action commenced. I must refer you to the Declaration of the field officers and the Resolutions of six Militia Companies herewith enclosed. I have been very much misinformed if the sentiments they contain are not common to all the Platoon officers of the 4th Regt.”
In addition to the national administration. Harrison knew that the opinion of his actions in Kentucky was particularly important because the majority of the population west of the Appalachian Mountains resided in that state. Any future command that he might be given in the west would have a large number of Kentuckians.
On December 30, 1811, Governor Charles Scott of Kentucky replied as follows to a letter written earlier by Harrison: “That you will never need any other defence against the malice and calumny of your enemies on this subject, than the plain and candid narrative you have done me the favor to send me, is I think, apparent to every honest mind. But I think you have not only not deserved censure, but that you have evinced those talents, which from a long acquaintance, I always believed you to possess, of the soldier and general, and I most sincerely trust your country will do justice to their worth.”
On January 7, 1812, Harrison again wrote the Secretary of War, this time enclosing the following statement signed by nine officers and two sergeants of the Regular Army who had taken part in the battle, a statement which is all the more impressive considering these men were still under the command of Colonel Boyd: “The Battle of Tippecanoe having terminated a campaign which led us to victory and honor, it is with pain we behold aspersions in the public prints aiming to destroy the confidence of our country in our late commander in chief….
“We therefore deem it our duty to state as in contestible facts that that the Commander in chief through out the campaign and in the hour of Battle proved himself the soldier and the general; … Should our Country again require our services to oppose a civilized or savage foe we should march under command of Governor Harrison with the most perfect confidence of victory and fame.”
On February 24, Harrison wrote a letter to the Vincennes Western Sun, subsequently published on April 18, which concluded with the following defense of the Indiana militia: “I could more easily have forgiven any reflection, however unjust, upon the living - but I can never forgive those cruel and unmerited reflections upon the memories of those gallant mortals who fell so gloriously and so disinterestedly, whose bodies are now exposed to be manglied by beasts of prey, & their bones whitened by the dews and winds of heaven….But while I have life, my voice at least shall be raised against every attempt to insult your ashes or tarnish the glory you have acquired.”
As the spring of 1812 arrived, Harrison’s statements, and the efforts of his friends, not only have prevented the ruination of his reputation, but had enhanced his position as the leading military figure in the west. This situation would prove to his advantage, and to the advantage of the United States, when war against Britain was declared in June.
|